

14 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : State-JCS Meeting on 14 December 1962 at 1130

PARTICIPANTS: Department of State

Assistant Secretary Philips Talbot
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador Averell Harriman
Ambassador John Galbraith
Ambassador Walter McCaughy

Department of Defense

Mr. William Bundy

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral George Anderson
General Earl G. Wheeler
General W. F. McKee
General David M. Shoup
Vice Admiral H. D. Riley

Central Intelligence Agency

Lt. General Marshall S. Carter

1. Assistant Secretary Talbot briefed on the effect of the Sino-Indian dispute on the overall Communist problem, non-alliance countries, Soviets, etc. He mentioned the possibility that India, Pakistan, and other Asia rim countries might develop a single foreign policy oriented toward the West. Mr. Talbot stated the major problems facing the U. S. are India-Pakistan relations, or Hindu-Moslem relations, adding that although Kashmir is a major issue, it alone is not a keystone.

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2. Ambassador Galbraith: India now most militantly anti-Communist, pro U. S. country in Asia. Also learned that "neutral neutralist" countries are not tied as closely as they thought. Realize US/UK, mostly U. S., met Indian requirements without exploiting the situation. Everything we did gave India a tremendous boost. Where do we go from here? How do we protect our present Indian image? How do we help solve the Kashmir problem? Both have very legitimate claims on the territory and needs for it -- must avoid a head-on confrontation. We must get our own benefits too -- have great opportunity -- should avoid putting it all in framework of military pacts, SEATO, etc. We must never offer Indians anything they didn't ask for -- they must conduct their own defenses. Most improbable conversation of the century was Galbraith negotiating with Nehru on U-2 overflights.

3. Ambassador McConaughy: As to Pakistan -- the most troublesome thing is the difference between the government and the public, press, etc. Government says they are still closely tied to U. S., but must still let the press go ahead with their diatribe. Ayub doubts he could withstand a public debate -- the government might fall. Says now is best time for Kashmir solution -- believes India will settle on reasonable solution if US/UK bring appropriate pressures through military assistance. Any solution will be unpopular in both countries. The spectre that confronts us in Pakistan is a breakdown in Kashmir, large-scale rearmament of India, and no fighting -- then Pakistanis are very liable to lose their stability, so stakes in Kashmir negotiations are very high for the U. S. The Pakistanis don't see Chinese military capabilities or intentions as seriously as the U. S. or India. Expect Chinese to use more subtle means of expansion such as infiltration, subversion, etc. The Pakistanis say as soon as Kashmir is settled, can come to joint defense agreement with India easily. The Pakistanis not now flirting with Chinese in spite of what press says. Ayub hopes for greater military aid after Kashmir is settled -- as part of joint defense -- on same scale as India.

As to Kashmir -- Ayub might agree to a compromise falling short of plebescite -- maybe a formal partition -- might even fall back to internationalizing "the veil" -- or UN supervision -- or something similar with India and Pakistanis having special rights therein -- there is possibility for a constructive solution if we can find ways of persuading the Indians without offense. We still have a worthy ally in Pakistan.

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4. Ambassador Harriman: Adams has established good rapport with Ayub. Subcontinent is key to the whole area between Turkey and Japan -- if we control it, have some chance in Southeast Asia. Must keep flexible. India is unpopular in East -- Nehru considered arrogant -- India cannot now assume leadership of SEA and subcontinent.

We must give Indians enough to put up a good show -- hold Chinese and then give them a bloody nose. We certainly have something to build on in subcontinent and it is most heartening. If we don't get it done today as with Ayub, never get it done.

In the event have complete impasse on Kashmir, the Ayub government might fall and Pakistanis might make pact with ChiComs. We must not do anything to disturb Indian/Soviet relationship because it might put Sino-Soviet relationships on a better keel.

5. Ambassador Galbraith: Indians do not believe Soviets can restrain Chinese -- and Galbraith does not believe Soviets will furnish MIG's to India.

6. Alexis Johnson: Report on Southeast Asia as it relates to subcontinent -- Diem thinks something might be developed if we get India-Pakistan agreement on Kashmir. Thais and Malaysians discouraged because of Philippine claims on North Borneo.

Thailand -- saw the wheels -- thinks country is good -- Sarit firmly in saddle -- economy vigorous -- in Northeast the Thais seem enthusiastic, especially with Border Police. We should support feeder road program. Thais sensitive to megawatt VOA transmitter.

Cambodia -- really no serious problems as between Thais and Cambodia -- Sarit thinks we should continue aid to Cambodia, but not too big.

Vientiane -- Souphonnaveg looked him straight in eye and denied any VietCong in SVN. Says too much emphasis being placed on Montagnards. While things look pretty good, the VietCongs are still increasing -- our intelligence on extent of infiltration still very poor.

MSC:blp

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

I had started to put your notes into full sentences but only got as far as paragraph 1 when you called for the memo yesterday. In doing the remainder of it, therefore, I typed it up exactly the way you had written it. Do you want me to retype it to put it in sentence form? Yes ☒ Or do you think it is all right as is? Yes ☒

Do you want any distribution made? No ☐
Yes ☒:

*as appropriate to
DCI, ExDir, DDI, DDP*

Barbara (15 Dec)
(DATE)

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